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[Summary] This paper reviews parts of the recent literature on trade and growth. 
The relationships between trade and growth have been extensively studied in recent 
research. Many studies indicate that trade stimulates income and growth. The literature is 
controversial and many studies are criticised for weaknesses in methodology. Despite the 
methodological controversies, most evidence gives support for the view that trade stimulates 
growth. It is argued that major deﬁciency in the literature is that it does not discriminate 
between the impact of market access in other countries and the impact of liberal domestic 
trade policies.   
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Introduction 
 
In debates about development issues international trade has gained increased 
attention. ‘Trade not aid’ has become a slogan among some. Among others the slogan 
‘Trade and aid’ is popular.  While import substitution and industry protection was 
popular in the post war period, now market access and trade liberalisation is on the 
agenda. In the WTO this point of view has gained acceptance. Through the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) member countries in the WTO are allowed 
to treat developing countries better than they treat other member countries. Such 
differentiated treatment of trading partners violates the most favoured nations 
treatment (MFN) principle in the WTO. This reflects that trade is recognised as an 
important determinant for economic development.  
 
In the current negotiations in the Doha-round – also paraphrased as the ‘Doha 
Development Agenda’ - developing countries demand increased market access for 
their export products. This applies in particular to agricultural goods. Better market 
access can be achieved by use of different strategies. One is general liberalisation of 
trade regimes. For agriculture this would imply lower import duties on imports from 
all countries. Another strategy would be to extend preferences for developing 
countries.  
 
In this note, some arguments about trade and development will be discussed. In the 
next section the theory on these issues are discussed. Thereafter we present the 
empirical literature and add some new findings. The literature on trade and growth is 
extensive. We have no ambition to present a complete survey, but limit ourselves to 
some important contributions.   
 
Trade and development.  
 
Why some countries are poor and some are rich is one of the most important and 
debated questions among economists, politicians and the wider audience. An 
important question is whether globalisation will tend to increase or reduce inequality 
between poor and rich countries. Naturally, there is no simple answer to this question. 
Even after decades with research and debates, scholars have not come to an agreement 
whether and to what extent trade liberalisation promotes development and economic 
growth. There are several reasons for this. One is methodological. Measuring the 
exact impact of trade liberalisation is difficult. Often both trade liberalisation and its 
consequences are difficult to quantify. One also has to control for other variables that 
influence. Import barriers are designed for many purposes and in many different 
ways. Therefore their effects will also be diverse. Another reason is that different 
researchers ask and answer different questions. For instance, the question whether 
trade promotes growth is a different one from the question whether trade liberalisation 
promotes growth.   
 
Our impression from the literature is that trade liberalisation may promote 
development, under certain circumstances and in some situations. Also, even if trade 
liberalisation is heatedly debated, other factors may be more important for growth and 
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development. The literature is extensive, so here we will discuss the most important 
lines of thought only. We will argue that an important deficiency in the existing 
literature is that is does not discriminate between countries’ market access in foreign 
markets and their openness for imports.  
 
In studies of economic growth, one approach has been to investigate whether poor 
countries tend to catch up with richer countries. Growth rates in income per capita in a 
period are assumed to be a function of income levels initially. If there is a systematic 
positive relationship, rich countries tend to have higher growth rates than poor 
countries. If so, income differences between countries tend to increase over time. This 
is denoted as divergence in economic development. If there is a negative relationship, 
the opposite is true.1 In this case income differences between countries tend to 
decrease. This is denoted as convergence in economic development. In figure 1, 
growth rates in 140 countries for the period from 1990 to 2002 are graphed against the 
levels of income per capita in 1990. The countries termed ‘developing’ (circles) are 
African, Latin American, Asia and Oceanian countries while the counties termed 
‘developed’ (triangles) are European and North American countries. The data used to 
construct the figure are from the World Bank.2 They are in purchasing power parities 
(PPP) so that the numbers better can be used for international comparisons. The 
numbers are also constant over time so that inflation is depressed.  
 
The figure does not give any evidence that there was convergence in the world 
economy during the 1990s. There is no systematic negative relationship between 
growth rates and initial income levels. In fact, there is a positive correlation between 
income levels in 1990 and average annual growth rates from 1990 to 2002. For 
developed countries this trend is pronounced and significant. On reason for this is the 
recessions in the formerly planned economies during transition to market based 
systems.  
 
Figure 1A in the appendix gives a somewhat different picture. In that figure, 
observations for each individual country are weighted by their population. The 
weights of India and China give an impression of convergence. The high growth rates 
in populous countries like China and India in this period, and also in Russia and 
Brazil at the end of the period, have affected many people. In sum these changes have 
counteracted the impact of divergence between countries so that global inequality 
measured in terms of average income per capita in each country, but weighted by 
population in each country, have declined. For the purpose of this paper, we stick to 
our cross-country approach un-weighted for population. The reason is that our focus 
is international trade and trade policy. In this respect, it is clear that countries are the 
units of observations and also the agents in question.  
 
                                                 
1 Barro (1991) is a classical reference. Also see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). There are several 
methodological reservations about the cross section regression approach, however. Inequality might 
increase even if poor countries grow faster than rich countries if there is frequent leapfrogging between 
countries on the income-ladder (Quah, 1993 and Quah, 1996). Furthermore, cross-section regressions 
do not take into account differences in size between countries. For instance, China and Luxembourg are 
weighted similarly in this approach. For an impression about developments in inequality between poor 
and rich people, population and within country inequality have to be taken into account.  Melchior and 
Telle (2001) discuss inequality in the world population. Maurseth (2003a) presents a survey of the 
literature.  
2 World Bank (2004). 
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Even if global income inequality when countries’ population is taken into account, 
has declined, the evidence presented in figure 1 tells a story about increasing income 
differences between countries. The 1990s was a period when trade liberalisation 
gained speed. The Uruguay round in the GATT was completed in 1993. These 
negotiations resulted in decreased tariffs for many goods, the TRIPS agreement on 
intellectual property rights and establishment of the WTO (from 1995 onwards). The 
developing countries gained increased market access for agricultural goods and in 
particular for textiles. In addition to the multilateral liberalisation of trade, the 1990s 
witnessed trade liberalisation at regional levels (in terms of free trade agreements 
(FTAs)) and unilaterally by many countries. Also, many countries shifted their 
economic systems from centrally planned to market based economies in this period. 
In sum therefore, the 1990s was a period of accelerated trade liberalisation in the 
world economy. In the same period, inequality between countries increased. Some 
countries, in particular African countries and formerly planned economies 
experienced negative growth over the period. There are therefore good reasons to be 
sceptical to messages that market based systems and trade liberalisation are panaceas 
for growth.  In fact, we do not witness high growth in most developing countries.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Growth and initial income levels.  
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We have calculated growth rates for 140 countries for the period from 1990 to 2002. 
Among the 45 African countries, 18 had negative average annual growth rates in the 
period from 1990 to 2002. 8 African countries had average annual growth rates above 
3 per cent. Among the 30 Asian countries, 5 countries had negative growth rates and 
10 had rates exceeding 3 per cent. In the European camp, most of the formerly 
planned economies experienced negative growth rates while most of the Western 
European countries had positive growth rates. There was one Western European 
country that experienced negative growth. This was Switzerland! In Latin America, 6 
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out of 24 countries had negative growth rates while only two had growth rates 
exceeding 3 per cent. Of the 40 countries that experienced negative growth, 18 were 
African, 14 were transition countries and seven were Latin American countries.  
 
Deviations in percentage points of growth rates are important. A country that grows at 
one per cent annually gets 22 per cent richer over a 20 years period. If on the other 
hand, the country manages to grow at three per cent annually, it gets 88 per cent richer 
during the same period.  
 
Figure 1 does not say anything about the relationships between trade, openness and 
development. It just describes one aspect of the international income distribution 
during a period in which there also has been intensive trade liberalisation.  
 
What are the mechanisms through which trade may stimulate growth? Here we focus 
on four effects that have been analysed much in the literature on trade and growth.  
 
Most economists agree that trade is important for economic welfare - not through 
exports - but through imports. Exports are the mean while imports are the end for 
international trade. The reason for a country to export is to become able to import. 
Through imports a country may be able to make use of products made abroad that 
would have been more costly to produce domestically. While this may seem obvious, 
it is very important. In many debates on international trade, market access and export 
performance is in focus. There are good reasons for this, but it should be kept in mind 
that the reason to export is to become able to pay for imports. So why is it important 
to engage in such trade? 
 
First: Trade stimulates growth because it allows imports of goods which would have 
been relatively more expensive to produce at home. This is the comparative 
advantage argument for trade. If this argument is valid, trade is most important not 
because it allows industrialisation in developing countries but because it allows more 
specialisation in the industries in which these countries have comparative advantages. 
By specialising in these industries countries may increase their access to goods for 
consumption. It is important that gains from trade do not depend on competitiveness. 
If a country is 10 percent as efficient as compared to another country in one industry 
and only 5 percent as efficient in the other industry, it will gain from trade even if it 
specialises in the first industry. This applies even if the other country is ten times as 
efficient.  
 
Comparative advantages may arise from many sources. One is technology. Some 
countries may (for many reasons) have relatively better technology for production of 
some goods relative to other countries. Germany is good at producing cars and 
Switzerland is good at producing watches. This may be due their access to different 
technologies in these two industries. Another reason for comparative advantages is 
factor endowments. If one country is relatively abundant in unskilled labour and 
another is relatively abundant in capital, the first country may be in a better position 
for production of labour-intensive goods while the other may be in a better position 
for production of capital-intensive goods. If comparative advantages are due to 
differences in resource endowments a very important, but still controversial 
hypothesis follows. This is the factor price equalisation theorem. Under stringent 
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conditions it can be shown that international trade may result in equal factor prices in 
all countries.3  
 
This is also a theory that explains why trade policy will be controversial. In a country 
which is relatively well endowed with capital, labour will be relatively scarce. As a 
result, labour intensive goods will be relatively expensive and wages will be relatively 
high. If this country opens up for trade labour-intensive goods will become cheaper 
and wages will fall. In this country workers have reasons to oppose trade 
liberalisation. In the other country, the opposite applies. In that country, labour 
intensive goods are relatively cheap while capital-intensive goods are relatively 
expensive. Therefore, workers will favour trade liberalisation while capital owners 
will not. Still total incomes in both countries increase as a result of trade.  
 
There are by now acceptance that complete factor price equalisation is at best a 
hypothetical result of free trade. The world has neither witnessed equalisation in profit 
rates, wages nor land rents. The theory is valid only under very strict conditions and 
many other factors influence on factor prices.4 However, the theoretical framework 
may indicate directions of change due to trade liberalisation. As such it also sheds 
light on the political economy of trade policy. It identifies losers and winners from 
liberalisation and therefore also the likely role of interest groups.  
 
For developing countries this is especially important. We have argued that 
international trade may increase a country’s total income. If a country has institutions 
that are able to compensate losers from international trade, trade may potentially 
benefit all inhabitants. The quality of institutions varies between countries. For poor 
countries, social security is often low and very often losers from trade are not 
compensated. Therefore, often trade liberalisation can increase levels of conflict in a 
society. In Ben-David et al. (1999) effects of trade policy on poverty are discussed. 
The links from agreements in the WTO to poor people in the third world are indirect 
and vague. Reductions in tariff rates benefit importers. These become able to import 
more. If markets work properly they may also sell the imported products at lower 
prices. Does that benefit the poor? This depends on the poors’ consumption patterns. 
Reduced tariff rates may also increase competition towards domestic producers. Some 
plants may have to close down. Does that benefit the poor? This depends on whether 
workers in these plants are among the poor and whether these poor are able to find 
better or equally paid work elsewhere. In sum therefore, the potential for trade to ease 
the life of poor countries’ poor may not always realize. Below we review a few 
empirical studies on the impacts of trade on domestic inequality and poverty. 
 
Trade theory based on endowments of resources most often assume that these 
endowments are fixed. For some of them this is clearly wrong. For instance, physical 
                                                 
3 The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of international trade is based on the neo-classical modelling 
framework. It is assumed that all countries produce all goods and that all countries have available the 
same production technology. 
4 For an overview of trade theory, see Krugman and Obstfeld (2003). A more advanced text is Helpman 
and Krugman (1985). For a review of the literature on the factor price equalisation theorem see, 
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995). They write: ‘More, importantly, the real question isn’t whether FPE 
(factor price equalisation) is true or not. Trust us, it isn’t true. The real question is what causes the 
violations that we observe.’ 
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and human capital are results of investment. Therefore countries are able to change 
their comparative advantages over time. We return to this below.  
 
In theories based on comparative advantage, protectionism is costly. Protection 
reduces trade and national incomes decreases as compared to free trade. However, as 
underlined above, interest groups may have different interest than to maximise 
national income.  
 
Second: Trade stimulates growth because there are increasing returns in production. 
Trade theory based on increasing returns have been analysed intensively during the 
last two decades.5 When there are increasing returns in production, unit costs are 
lower when the scale of production is large. Therefore, two countries that produce two 
goods will be able to increase their total production if one country specialises in 
production of one good and the other country specialises in production of the other 
good. If these two goods belong to the same industry, there is two-way trade for this 
industry. Such two-way trade in industries constitutes a large and increasing share of 
total world trade, in particular for trade between developed countries.  
 
It is important that trade explained by increasing returns do no depend on differences 
between countries like the theories of comparative advantages do. When countries are 
different however, trade based on increasing returns may give different results than 
trade based on comparative advantages does. Industries in the largest and most 
developed countries may benefit at the cost of smaller and less developed countries. 
This is because large countries may have a cost advantage over small countries with a 
smaller home market. In order to build manufacturing industries, some may argue that 
there is need for protection in small countries. Market access however, is important. 
Market access will allow countries to build up competitive industries.   
 
Third: Trade may have dynamic effects. The effects of trade described above are 
static. Both comparative advantages and increasing returns may give rise to higher 
incomes, but not necessarily higher growth rates. Trade is important however, also 
because it stimulates technology production and technology diffusion. Recent growth 
theories have focused on motives for R&D and effects of technology diffusion. There 
is a growing literature on growth effects of trade. One possible effect is that trade 
increases growth because it makes R&D more profitable. Since trade increases the 
markets in which a new good is sold, it may pay more off to do research to develop 
new products as compared to a situation in which new goods can be sold domestically 
only.6 
 
Another effect of trade on growth is that it allows technology diffusion from 
technologically sophisticated countries to lagging countries. As such trade may 
stimulate economic convergence between countries. Even if new goods are developed 
in developed countries, developing countries may benefit from imports of these goods 
and from technology diffusion for domestic production.7 
 
                                                 
5 See Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Dixit and Norman (1980).  
6 These effects are discussed in Helpman and Grossman (1991) and in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). 
7 Eaton and Kortum (2001 and 2002) discuss these effects of international trade. Lucas (1988) is also a 
classic reference in this respect. Krugman (1979) and Helpman (1993) discuss the effects of intellectual 
property rights on relative income levels and growth rates in rich and poor countries.  
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New growth theory has also identified a third mechanism through which trade may 
both increase or reduce long run growth in countries. Productivity in industries often 
evolves as an unintended effect of learning by doing. Firms learn from each other and 
ideas developed by one firm are picked up by others. In turn this stimulates new 
technology in other firms. In some industries such dynamic learning effects are 
important. Over time productivity growth in these industries may be high.  In some 
industries they may be less important. If trade causes a country to specialise in a 
dynamic industry with high growth potentials in the long rung, trade may increase the 
long run growth in this country. If trade causes the country to specialise in industries 
that lack such growth potentials, trade may decrease long run growth. Note that when 
such a process has been going on for a time it will be increasingly difficult to catch up 
with the leading industry. Therefore, specialisation in the ‘wrong’ industries, e.g. 
because of static comparative advantages, may become an underdevelopment trap in 
the long run.8 
 
This gives arguments for use of trade policy. By means of trade policy a country may 
stimulate the high growth industry, for instance by use of tariffs. When the industry 
has grown more competitive the tariff is no longer necessary. This is the infant 
industry argument for trade policy. This is an old idea but its popularity has varied. 
Historically Adam Smith was in favour of free trade while Friedrich List favoured 
protection.  
 
Infant industry tariffs to protect growing industries have been used by many 
developed countries during their phases of industrialisation.9 Infant industry 
protection was also used intensively by developing country in the post-war period.  
 
Former minister of finance in Argentina, Raul Prebisch (1959) argued that also 
another argument favours protection. Countries specialised in industries for which 
there is a low elasticity of income in the world market may experience reduced 
growth opportunities as compared to other countries. When world income increase, 
the demand for products from such countries will not grow as fast as demand from 
other countries. Therefore, such countries may become lost in a low-growth trap from 
which they have to escape by switching their industrial structures to other industries 
with higher income elasticities of demand. In order to be able for such structural 
changes in their economies, trade policy measures may be effective. 
 
From the 1970s on however, scepticism about protection and import substitution has 
increased. Baldwin (2000) explains this by the historical experiences. Many countries 
have tried to increase their industrial bases by means of tariffs, but success has been 
limited. Among the countries that have grown fast, infant industry protection seems to 
have had a limited role. Johansson (2005) argues that import substitution with high 
tariffs on manufactured goods have harmed many developing countries. It has 
increased the prices of imported goods, reduced efficiency in manufacturing and 
prevented specialisation according to comparative advantages. She argues that the 
reasons that import substitution has been so popular are ideological prejudices and 
imperfect information. Policy makers did simply not have access to correct analyses 
and information.   
                                                 
8 Romer (1986 and 1990) and Lucas (1988) are important references in this respect. So is Young 
(1991). 
9 For a historical overview, see Chang (2002) 
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This is a controversial point of view however. During some periods, import 
substitution has occurred at the same time as high growth rates. This was the case for 
many developed countries during their industrialisations, for developing countries in 
the post-war period and for the centrally planned economies in several periods. 
Clemens and Williamson (2004) present evidence suggesting that tariffs was 
positively correlated with growth before 1914, uncorrelated with growth in the inter-
war period and negatively correlated with growth after world war II. They argue that 
one reason for this is that average tariff rates in the world economy have decreased. 
They argue that protection is growth promoting when other countries’ tariffs are high, 
that there is a negative relationship between protection and growth when other 
countries’ tariff rates are low. Clemens and Williamson’s data are restricted to a 
smaller sample of countries for which long time series of tariff rates are available, 
however.  
 
There are several reasons why infant industry protection may be problematic and also 
risky. The first is that it may be difficult for governments to know in advance which 
industry that has long run growth potentials. If the government is wrong and protects 
the wrong industries, infant industry protection will be harmful. The second argument 
is that most industries will try to obtain protection. Therefore, industrialists will try to 
lobby for protection of their business. Infant industry protection may therefore 
stimulate rent seeking behaviour. A third reason is that high tariff barriers on imports 
may prevent technology diffusion from abroad since very often such new 
technologies are embedded in goods that are imported. A fourth reason is that 
competition, also from foreign countries, will increase efficiency.  
 
The arguments about infant industry protection may be wrong also for another reason. 
Take the example with two industries with different growth potential over time. One 
grows slowly (or not at all) while the other industry grows fast due to e.g. learning 
mechanisms. If one country specialises in the low growth industry its productivity 
will grow slowly. However, productivity growth in the other industry is high. 
Therefore prices for products belonging to this industry will tend to decline. This will 
benefit the slowly growing country too. This is not just an academic example. Finland 
has benefited from specialisation in production of cellular telephones. NOKIA has 
grown to a large multinational company. Naturally, this has stimulated growth in 
Finland. It has also benefited other countries. Now cellular phones are in use all over 
the world, also among poor people.  
 
In much theoretical work on trade policy, unemployment is assumed to be non-
existent. This is not realistic. Unemployment exists and is often much higher in 
developing than in developed countries. In many countries, there is a so-called dual 
economic system. This is a system in which there is one modern high-wage industry 
and a larger, old-fashioned low-wage sector. Often the low-wage sector is agriculture. 
In the agricultural sector there is over-employment so that total production would not 
decrease much if employment was reduced. For economic development it is crucial to 
move the working population from low-productivity agricultural employment to 
employment with higher returns. For this to be possible productivity growth both in 
agriculture and in manufacturing and services are important. This gives arguments 
that market access both for agricultural products and for manufactures is important.  
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Finally, trade policy in terms of tariffs and other taxes is often used not only to protect 
industries but also as a source of government incomes. In figure 2 we show import 
taxes as a share of government incomes versus (the log of) income per capita. The 
figure shows that import taxes are important for government incomes in many 
countries, in particular among the poor ones.  
 
Poor countries often have low institutional qualities. This means that they often will 
have problems in establishing efficient and modern tax authorities. Taxing profits, 
wage income and land rents are common in rich countries. This requires relatively 
advanced institutions and a well-organised society. For poor countries modern tax 
systems are often out of reach. Therefore they rely more on imperfect tax objects. 
International trade is often taxed, often simply because it easy. This reduces growth 
and economic performance.   
 
 
 
Figure 2 Import duties as percent of tax income and income per capita. 
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Source: World Bank (2004) 
 
In sum, economic theory gives arguments for free trade but also for protection in 
certain circumstances. Despite decades of research there is no agreement about the 
right development strategies for poor countries. Tariffs may increase growth and they 
may reduce distributional conflicts in countries. It is clear however, that tariffs may 
also be abused and that they have the potential to harm economic development. One 
important message from the theoretical literature is that trade liberalisation may have 
different impacts in different circumstances. This is partly because a wide set of other 
factors, also political ones, influence on development. Winters (2004) presents a 
review of how other policies and institutions are linked with effects of trade policy. 
Winters discusses the relationships between trade policy and variables like corruption, 
macroeconomic stability, institutional quality and education.  
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Even if the relationships between domestic trade policies and development are not 
unambiguous, it is clear from our review that in most cases tariffs will harm exporting 
countries. This is important for the perspective in this note: Tariffs imposed by rich 
countries in order to protect their industries are harmful for those countries that do not 
get access to these markets. In the appendix, a graphical representation of effects of 
tariffs for importing and exporting countries is presented. It is clear from the figures 
presented there, that exporting countries normally loose from other countries’ 
protectionism.  
 
Trade and growth – a first look 
How does empirical research conclude about trade and growth? Is there a neat 
correlation between international trade and growth? Is it exports or imports that 
matters? What is the role of trade policy? Before we look at the data a clarification of 
terminology is called for. Most trade theories are static economic theories. Trade 
liberalisation may increase income and therefore lead to increased growth for a 
transitional period. After the transitional period growth rates will not be affected. 
Some growth theories also indicate such level effects of trade liberalisation. 
Liberalisation increases levels of income and therefore the growth rate for a period, 
but it does not increase long-term growth rates. Other growth theories do predict 
changes in long run growth rates as a consequence of international trade. The 
difference between level and growth effects is very important. As mentioned above, 
just small deviations in percentage points in long term growth rates aggregate into 
large income differences over time. For our purpose however, we stick to growth 
effects of trade. That is, we try to investigate whether trade leads to growth and we 
focus less on whether trade leads to higher income. Our main reason for this is that 
our ten years period is too short to disentangle between short run and long run. 
Furthermore, growth effects are more important, but also harder to detect from the 
data than level effects. As such we look for stricter evidence on the impact of 
international trade on development by focusing on growth rather than levels.  
 
Figures 3a and 3b graph income levels per capita and growth rates against trade as a 
share of GDP. Trade is measured as export plus imports. The data are from the World 
Bank (2004). This graph gives indications that trade is good for income and somewhat 
weaker indications that trade is good for growth. There is a positive relationship 
between trade as share of GDP and income levels and growth rates. Regressing 
growth rates and income levels on trade shares give a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (at the 10 percentage level for growth and at the 5 percentage 
level for (log of) income levels.  
 
Despite the evidence presented in figure 3b (and 3a) there are many reservations 
before one can conclude that trade stimulates growth. First, several factors influence 
on growth, like investments and population size. Second, it is well known that small 
countries trade more as compared to their GDP than large countries. This is because 
more of world’s supply of and demand for products is outside small countries as 
compared to larger countries. Therefore, one also has to control for size. Third, even if 
there is a positive relation, one cannot conclude about the direction of causation. Does 
trade cause growth or does growth cause trade? In figure 3b trade shares in the 
beginning of the period is graphed against subsequent growth. This is not, however, a 
robust check for causation. Fourth, geography plays an important role. It is well 
known that neighbour countries tend to trade more than distant countries. Therefore, 
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one implication is that countries with large average distances to other countries will 
tend to trade less than others. Fifth, the trade measure used to construct figure 3 is the 
sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. As such, the figure does not reveal 
whether it is exports or imports (or both) that potentially stimulate growth. Sixth, the 
figure below does not say anything about trade policy. Therefore, it is not possible to 
conclude from the figure whether a liberal imports regime stimulates growth or if 
open markets in foreign countries exports are important. Despite all these hesitations, 
figures 3a and b do give the impression that countries that trade a lot (in relation to 
their GDP) also experience higher income levels and growth rates.  
 
 
Figure 3a Growth and income levels 
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Figure 3b Growth and trade 
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Several studies conclude that trade is good for growth. However, many studies fail to 
take into account the reservations mentioned above. Many studies make use of either 
trade as share of GDP or growth rates in trade as explanatory variables in cross-
country growth regressions. In such regressions several variables are inserted into a 
regression model that attempts to explain economic growth.  
 
In table 1 we present regression results for economic growth. We include as 
explanatory variables (log of) initial GDP per capita, trade as a share of GDP, (log of) 
population and (log of) gross fixed capital formation as share of GDP (GFC). Initial 
GDP per capita controls for convergence. Gross fixed capital formation measures 
investments. In addition we included the interaction term between trade as share of 
GDP and population (interaction). This will to some extent account for the fact that 
small countries trade more than rich countries compared to their GDP. We also 
include a number of dummy variables. Dummy variables take the values zero or one 
to measure whether a country belong to a certain category or nor. The dummy 
variables used are for each continent and for whether the country is in transition from 
a planned to a market based system. We believe that many other variables influence 
on growth. Such variables could be education, institutional quality, rule of law and the 
protection of property rights. A problem in growth regressions is that good variables 
are only available for a small number of countries. Our choice of variables is the 
result of a trade off between sample size and inclusion of relevant variables. In total 
we have 110 countries in our sample. We report the coefficients from the regression 
(the estimated impact) and the p-value. The p-value denotes the statistical significance 
of the estimated coefficients. A p-value lower than 0.1 indicates statistical 
significance (at the ten percentage level). The R2 is a measure for the overall fit of the 
model. R2 varies between 0 and 1, with 1 as the highest possible.  
 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 14
 
Table 1 
 
N=110 R2=0.35  
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
lgdp90 -0.0041 0.128 
lpop90 0.0048 0.049 
TRAD 0.0008 0.014 
Interaction -0.0001 0.026 
Lgfc 0.0282 0.007 
Trans -0.0218 0.081 
Europe 0.0003 0.934 
Asia -0.0118 0.029 
Africa -0.0226 0.000 
Namerica -0.0063 0.277 
Lamerica -0.0128 0.004 
 
The table gives some indications that trade is good for growth. The partial effect of 
the trade variable is positive and significant at the five per cent level (p-value lower 
than 0.05). In addition to trade also population size and investments seem to correlate 
positively with growth. The dummy variables for transition countries and for Africa 
are negative and significant. Note however, that the results reported are not robust to 
inclusion of variables. When population is left out, the effect of trade becomes 
insignificant. When the interaction term between size and trade is left out, the trade 
share is also not significant. The regressions are robust however, for inclusion of 
dummy variables. As we will return to below, this is important because dummy 
variables for continents capture many variables that explain growth.  
 
As mentioned above, a positive correlation between trade shares in GDP and growth 
is not enough to conclude that trade is good for growth. Neither can one conclude that 
liberal trade policies are good for growth. We will discuss these hesitations in turn. 
 
More robust measures for trade’s impact on growth. 
 
We have discussed above that correlations between trade and growth may give a 
wrong impression that trade causes growth. It might be, for example, that some third 
variable explains both trade and growth. Inclusion of more explanatory variables in 
our growth regression is one way to try to control for such variables. Above we 
included investments, population and initial income. In our data trade as share of GDP 
and investments are positively correlated. By inclusion of both we control for their 
independent effects. However, there might be (and probably there are) other variables 
that correlate both with growth and trade. It is hardly possible to control for all 
potential variables.  
 
One way to control for these problems is to use changes in growth rates rather than 
growth rates and changes in trade-related variables rather than the levels of these 
trade-related variables. This is the strategy chosen by Dollar and Kray (2004). They 
present regressions of changes in growth rates over a period on changes in the volume 
of trade. Dollar and Kraay argue that this strategy controls for other variables that 
influence both on growth and trade but which are constant over time. One typical 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 15
example of such variables is geography. It might be that tropical countries have both 
lower growth rates and less trade than other countries. By looking at changes over 
time one controls for this since being tropical does not change over time. Dollar and 
Kraay’s results show that changes in trade shares do indeed correlate with subsequent 
growth. Their results indicate that this effect is substantial. Their lowest estimate 
indicates that a 100 percentage increase in trade increase growth rates by 25 
percentage. Dollar and Kraay’s study has some drawbacks however. One is that they 
omit several variables that we know influence on growth and that change over time. 
One example is investments. Another example is education. Another drawback is that 
it might not be true that Dollar and Kraay actually control for variables that are 
constant over time. This is because the impact of such variables may change over 
time. It is well-known that growth rates in countries correlate with growth rates in 
neighbour countries. In some periods a ‘cluster’ of countries may experience low 
growth. In other periods the same cluster may experience higher growth rates. 
Therefore, even if the location of a country is constant, the impact of this location 
may change depending on whether neighbour countries experience high or low 
growth. 
 
An alternative strategy is to investigate the determinants of trade and construct a new 
measure that indicates trade, but does not reflect determinants of growth. This has 
become a common way to investigate the impact of trade on growth. Below we sketch 
the strategy and give some references to the literature.  
 
Bilateral trade is known to be approximated very well with the so-called gravity of 
international trade. For a pair of countries, i and j, the following expression ‘explains’ 
trade with a high degree of empirical exactness: 
 
ltradeij=a1 lgdpi + a2 lgdpj + a3 ldistanceij 
 
Above, lgdp denotes the log of total GDP and ldistance the log of the distance 
between the two countries. The as are coefficients. These are elasticities so that they 
indicate the percentage increase in trade per percentage increase in the variables. 
Fitted models give positive signs for a1 and a2 and negative signs for a3. In Maurseth 
(2005) we make use of this model in order to investigate Norway’s trade with 
developing countries.  
 
A corollary of and an approximation to the gravity model is that total trade as share of 
GDP (for country i) will be given as a variant of the following expression: 
tradei/gdpi=S(gdpj/distanceij) 
 
This expression says that trade as share of GDP equals a weighted sum of all other 
countries’ GDP. The weights are the inverse of the distance between the country in 
question and the country’s trading partners. We calculated a distance matrix based on 
the latitude and longitude of the capitals of all countries. By means of the resulting 
distance matrix we calculated the above expression for all the countries in our sample 
The resulting expression is commonly as denoted countries’ market potential. This is 
because it reflects how close a country is to markets around the world. Mexico for 
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instance, has a large market potential since it is close to the large US market. South 
Africa is surrounded by poor neighbours and therefore has a low market potential. An 
alternative to using trade shares directly in growth regressions is to use trade 
determinants. For our purpose, this strategy would imply to insert the market potential 
into a growth regression instead of trade shares.  
 
The implicit hypothesis behind such a strategy is the following: It might be that trade 
and growth correlates because of some variables that influence on both. Productivity, 
R&D, institutional quality and other variables are important for growth. Probably they 
are also important for countries’ international competitiveness. Since we do not have 
data for all these variables (and since it would be a difficult task to estimate their joint 
influence) it not possible to include them in the growth regression. However, these 
variables do not influence directly on a country’s market potential. A country’s 
market potential is defined only by geography and other countries’ total income.  
 
In table 2 we report results from a growth regression that includes (the log of) market 
potential instead of trade as share of GDP.  
 
 
Table 2.  
 
N=110 R2=0.35  
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
lgdp90 -0.0038 0.179 
lpop90 0.0004 0.714 
lmp90 0.0093 0.094 
lgfc 0.0314 0.001 
trans -0.0237 0.060 
europe -0.0148 0.138 
asia -0.0160 0.019 
africa -0.0270 0.001 
namerica -0.0123 0.192 
lamerica -0.0185 0.004 
 
 
It is seen from the regression results that market potential seems to correlate 
positively and significantly with growth. The significance however, is weak. 
Therefore, these results are in line with Frankel and Romer (1999). Frankel and 
Romer test correlations between trade and income levels for a large set of countries. 
They go a long way in order to control for possible correlations between trade and 
growth that stem from other factors. Their approach is to use well-known 
determinants for trade, and in particular geography and size, to construct a variable 
that correlates with trade, but not with growth. Thereafter they test whether this 
constructed variable is correlated with income levels. Frankel and Romer conclude 
that trade correlates with income (and therefore with growth). Their results indicate 
that the impact of trade on growth is substantial, but not very statistically significant. 
This is in line with our results. This means that even if there is a positive correlation, 
trade alone is not the only determinant for growth. Noguer and Siscart (2005) find 
more precise, robust and significant results based on a larger and more detailed 
dataset, but with essentially the same method as the one used by Frankel and Romer. 
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Both the results reported in table 2 and those found by Frankel and Romer indicate 
that trade is good for growth.  
 
The results obtained by Frankel and Romer were criticised in Rodrik and Rodriguez 
(2001). They argue that the geography-based indicators used by Frankel and Romer 
correlate not only with trade but also independently with growth. Therefore, the 
positive effect on growth by their trade measure might not be a result of trade per se. 
How can this be the case? Rodrik and Rodriguez argue that the geographical variables 
used correlates with growth. African countries, for instance, all have low market 
potential and low growth. Low growth in Africa might be because climate and other 
geographical variables influence. As such Africa’s low market potential may not be 
the explanation why Africa grows slowly. Rodriguez and Rodrik show that Frankel 
and Romer’s results vanish when geographical variables are included as control in the 
regressions. Noguer and Siscart include variables that control for geography and still 
find positive effects of trade on growth. Note that our continental dummy variables 
are introduced for the same purpose. If e.g. Africa grows less for geographical reasons 
(or other common Africa reasons), this is controlled for.  
 
Ben-David (1996) and Ben-David et al. (1999) study growth and trade from a 
different perspective. Ben-David’s point of the departure is the literature on 
convergence. Table 1 and 2 above report results from regressions of growth on initial 
levels of income (and other variables). The results indicate insignificant convergence. 
The coefficients for initial income are negative, but the p-values are larger than 0.1. It 
is a well-known result however, that over long periods, there is conditional 
convergence (see e.g Barro, 1991 and Baumol, 1986). This means that groups of 
countries that share similar characteristics converge in income per capita. Ben-
David’s approach is to study convergence conditional on trade patterns. For each 
country in his sample, Ben-David constructs new samples of countries constituting 
these countries’ main trading partners. He shows that countries seem to converge in 
income levels towards their trading partners. In essence this result indicates that 
trading countries become more similar. Ben-David also shows that this type of 
convergence is of the catching-up-type: Poor countries catch up with their richer 
trading partners.  
 
Gaulier (2003) argues that there are two weaknesses in Ben-David’s results. First, 
even if there is convergence in the sense that poor countries on average catch up with 
their trading partners, this does not lead to reduction in differences in standards of 
living. The reason is that there are shocks and disturbances in income levels that 
counteract the convergence process (cfr. footnote 1 and Quah, 1993). If a poor 
country grows fast and a rich country grows slowly, the result might be that income 
differences between these two countries is the same after a period if the poor country 
has grown richer than the rich country. 
 
Second, the result obtained by Ben-David is biased because some large countries (in 
particular USA, Japan and the larger European countries) get high weights. These 
countries are big and therefore major trading partners for many countries. If the 
United States for a period experiences low growth this will go a long way in 
explaining Ben-David’s findings since USA is an important trading partner for many 
countries. Gaulier therefore concludes that the results obtained by Ben-David do not 
necessarily imply that trade stimulates catching up. 
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Both the results obtained by Ben-David and those reported on above take into account 
the geographical position of countries. Since countries that are close to each other 
trade more, the impacts of geography are (more – as in the study by Levine and 
Renelt – or less directly– as in the study by Ben-David) taken into account. 
Geography is known to be important not only for international trade but also for other 
variables, like foreign direct investments and e.g. knowledge spillovers.10 Since 
economic interaction depends on geography, it is a possible hypothesis that also 
growth depends on geography. If so, growth-stimulating policies in one country only 
may be less efficient than co-ordinated policies. For trade policy it might be more 
important to stimulate trade among neighbouring developing countries than between 
rich and poor countries.  
 
Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) use a very detailed database for more than 100 
countries and for a long period to investigate relationships between trade and growth. 
One important finding in their paper is that a distance-weighted growth rates in other 
countries seem to influence positively on growth. This means that an expression of 
neighbour countries’ growth rates influence on growth rates in individual countries. 
Growth is contagious and spills over to neighbour countries. This may be one reason 
why we observe clusters of rich and poor countries in the world economy. Arora and 
Vamvakidis actually find that the effect of such local spillovers is more important for 
growth than trade is.  
 
In order to get an impression of whether growth is geographically contagious figure 3 
plots individual countries growth rates against the weighted average of other countries 
growth rates. Individual countries’ growth rates (normalised to the average) are shown 
along the horizontal axis and the weighted growth rates of countries are shown along 
the vertical axis. The weights decrease with geographical distance. Therefore, 
observations in the first (northwest) quadrant indicate countries with high growth 
rates surrounded by other countries with high growth rates. Observations in the third 
(southeast) quadrant indicate countries with low growth rates that are surrounded with 
other low-growth countries. Observations in the second (southwest) quadrant indicate 
countries with high growth rates surrounded by countries with low growth rates. The 
interpretation of the fourth quadrant follows.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See e.g. Brenton and Di Mauro (1999) and Narvestad (2000) for international investments or Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) for technology spillovers. 
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Figure 3 Moran scatterplot of growth 
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The figure gives some support for the idea that growth is geographically contagious. 
Growth in one country tends to spill over to neighbour countries. This is seen from the 
positively sloping regression line in the figure and by the fact that there are more 
observations in the first and the third quadrant than in the other two. To stimulate 
growth in poor countries therefore, it is good to stimulate growth in several countries 
in the region in which this country is located.  
 
Table 3 presents results from a so-called spatial lag regression model. In this model 
the coefficient ? measures the effect of spatial spillovers. The regression results 
indicate that growth is indeed contagious. A one percentage point change in growth 
rates changes growth in the same direction in other countries with an elasticity of 
about 0.50. It is an important research task to investigate whether this relationship is 
robust to inclusion of other variables and whether it applies to all countries or sub 
samples of countries only.  
 
Table 3 Spatial growth 
 
R2=0.10 N=129  
Variable   
Growth Coefficient P-value 
lgdp90 0.002 0.70 
lpop90 0.001 0.49 
LGFC 0.018 0.014 
? 0.0519 0.067 
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Imports or exports? 
 
Note that the results reported on and reviewed so far only reflect total trade. Trade as 
share of GDP includes both exports and imports. Market potential reflects both export 
potential (how close a country is to important markets) and import potential (how 
close a country is to major suppliers of goods). Is it imports or exports that stimulates 
growth? In the theoretical discussion in the introduction we argued that imports are 
the end and exports are the means in international trade. If exports did not increase the 
ability to import, it would be better to use the productive resources that produced the 
exported goods for other purposes. Exports are necessary in order to pay for imports, 
however. In the long run a country will run into balance of payments problems if its 
exports is smaller than its imports. There are some exceptions from this. The first is 
that countries whose currencies are international reserves may have long run deficits 
in their current account. The USA and potentially Europe are in this position. A 
second exception is countries that receive development assistance from abroad. 
Furthermore, our period, from 1990 to 2002, is so short that trade deficits and 
surpluses can easily exist without limiting growth.  Therefore it is of interest to try to 
discriminate the effects of exports versus imports on economic growth.  
 
In the literature on trade and growth only few attempts has been done to discriminate 
the effects of imports from the effects of exports. Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) is one 
exception. Their strategy is to link growth in a country’s trading partners economies 
to growth in the country itself. As mentioned above they use geography as one type of 
link. They also use a country’s exports to its trading partner as another type of link. 
Arora and Vamvakidis find that growth in a country’s trading partners significantly 
and strongly influences on growth. This is interesting in at least two respects: First it 
indicates that growth spill over to other countries, both as a function of distance and 
as a function of international trade. This is similar to what we found above. Second, 
they show that exports links growth in neighbour countries to individual countries. It 
is well known that imports may serve as such a link. Coe and Helpman (1995) is one 
pioneering study in this respect. This is explained by the hypothesis that being able to 
import means being able to import high-tech intermediates and consumer goods. The 
fact that also exports serves as a growth-promoting link indicates that market access 
to high growth countries also stimulates growth. One reason may be that demand is 
higher when market potential is high. Another may be that demand for high 
technology is higher when market potential is high. A third reason may be that 
technology spills over to nearby countries via other links so that these countries in 
turn come in a better position to export. More research is needed to shed light on 
possible mechanisms.  
 
Below we report results on imports’ and exports’ influence on growth. We follow the 
same strategy as we did before. The first results are based on countries’ exports and 
imports performance. These variables as shares of GDP are included in our growth 
regressions together with an interaction term between these shares and the size of the 
country in terms of population. Results are reported in table 4 and 5 (but we omit 
results for the dummy variables). For the results obtained here we relied on data from 
the COMTRADE database. This database contains trade statistics reported from 
national authorities. We prefer to use trade data in the beginning of the period. This is 
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because our hypothesised relationship is from trade to growth and not the opposite. 
Since reporting procedures were weaker before (and because some countries have 
ceased to exist) this reduced the sample size from 110 to 72 for imports and to 102 for 
exports.11 
 
 
Table 4 Effects of imports on growth 
 
N=72 R2=0.37  
Variable Coefficient P-value 
lgdp90 -0.0046 0.122 
lpop90 0.0049 0.044 
Imports/GDP 0.1932 0.013 
Interaction -0.0107 0.021 
Lgfc 0.0274 0.017 
 
Note: Dummy variables for each continent and transition countries were included but are not reported. 
 
Table 4 indicates large and significant effects of imports on growth. One percentage 
point increase in imports as share of GDP raises growth with 0.2 percentage point. 
The coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level. This is an important result and 
should be taken as a reminder that imports is why a country should export. When the 
regression reported on in table 4 was rerun only for the 75 per cent poorest countries 
in the world, the results were the same. So it was for the 50 per cent poorest countries. 
The results are therefore robust for country at all income levels.  
 
Table 5 Effects of exports on growth 
 
N=102 R2=0.34  
Variable Coefficient P-value 
lgdp90 -0.0034 0.279 
lpop90 0.0031 0.174 
exports/GDP 0.3030 0.119 
Interaction -0.0189 0.109 
Lgfc 0.0298 0.009 
 
Note: Dummy variables for each continent and transition countries were included but are not reported. 
 
The results reported on in table 5 give less reasons to believe that export performance 
is important for growth. The coefficient for exports is positive and of larger 
magnitude than it was for imports. It is not significant however. For exports reducing 
the sample similarly as we did for imports were instructive: For poor countries 
exports enter positively and significant as explanatory variable for growth. This may 
indicate that being able to export is more important for poor countries than it is for 
rich countries.  This result gives some support to the ones reported by Santos-Paulino 
and Thirlwall (2004). They find that trade liberalisation stimulates imports more than 
exports. Therefore, trade liberalisation sometimes has as a negative side effect that the 
                                                 
11 When we used trade data for 2000 the results obtained were qualitatively similar, but we had more 
observations.  
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balance of payment worsens. Balance of payments problems are often more severe for 
poor countries. Rich (and large) countries often have better access to international 
credit markets than poor (and small) countries have. This may explain the special 
importance of exports for these countries.  
 
For imports and exports the same hesitations as for total trade applies. Variables that 
correlate with trade may also correlate with growth. Also, reverse causation may 
occur, so that growth causes trade. For instance, countries that are on a peak in the 
business cycle will often run a trade deficit while countries in recession often import 
less.  
 
We therefore introduce countries’ exports and imports potential. A country’s imports 
potential is calculated as all other countries’ exports weighted by the inverse of the 
distance to the country in question. A country’s exports potential is calculated as the 
other countries’ imports, weighted by the inverse of the distance to the country in 
question. The construction of these variables therefore resembles the construction of 
our market potential measure used above.  We constructed these imports and exports 
potentials as shares of GDP. These variables were in turn normalised to the average 
for all countries. We report on these results in tables 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6 Growth and imports potential 
 
N=110 R2=0.33  
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
lgdp90 -0.0034 0.238 
lpop90 0.0007 0.536 
importpotential 0.0064 0.058 
Lgfc 0.0316 0.001 
Trans -0.0227 0.067 
Europe -0.0099 0.139 
Asia -0.0116 0.041 
Africa -0.0238 0.000 
namerica -0.0060 0.311 
Lamerica -0.0135 0.007 
 
 
Table 6 indicates that import potential is important for growth. The estimated 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. This implies that 
countries that are ’well suited’ for imports, in the sense that they are located close to 
major exporters, experience higher growth than other countries do. This is an 
important result. The results reported in table 4 (on imports and growth) are parallel to 
the ones obtained by Coe and Helpman (1995). Coe and Helpman used imports 
directly, but they weighted imports from different trading partners by these imports’ 
R&D content. They found that imports of high-tech goods (defined as having high 
R&D contents) are positive for growth. Coe and Helpman included only developed 
countries in their sample. In a more recent exercise, Coe et al. (1997) applied the 
same method to a broader sample of countries including developing countries. 
Essential they found the same results also for developing countries.  Imports of high-
tech goods stimulate growth. Related studies to those of Coe and Helpman are Eaton 
and Kortum (2001 and 2002). Eaton and Kortum note that most capital goods are 
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produced in rich countries and that capital producing industries are R&D intensive. 
Investments in such goods are important for growth. Countries localised far away 
from capital producers are therefore in a worse condition than countries being 
localised close to capital producing countries. Capital goods are simply more 
expensive for these countries. Regression results in Eaton and Kortum give support 
for the hypothesis that these mechanisms are important. The results obtained in Eaton 
and Kortum and in table 6 above differ from those of Coe and Helpman, however. 
Coe and Helpman used data for imports directly. Thus, their study potentially reflects 
the impact of imports of high tech goods. Their methodology is subject to the same 
criticism as above. It might be that some variable, for instance investments, explain 
both imports and growth. If so, the connection between imports and growth is an 
indirect one. Our result is not based on observations of countries’ import, but on their 
import potential. Therefore our results should not correlate with other national 
determinants of growth. A similar result is obtained in Maurseth (2003) where a 
theoretical model based on the modelling framework by Eaton and Kortum is also 
presented.  
 
What about export potential? In debates on globalisation poor countries’ market 
access to developed countries’ market is regarded as particularly important. In the 
negotiations on the trade liberalisation in the Doha round in the WTO, developing 
countries most important demand is better market access in rich countries. In our 
discussion above and in the appendix we gave some reasons why tariff barriers are 
costly for exporting countries. Furthermore, as analysed by Prebish (1959) and in a 
wide set of subsequent contributions, balance of payments restrictions may be more 
severe for developing countries than for developed countries. Increasing developing 
countries’ market access may therefore be of particular importance for stimulating 
growth in developing countries.   
 
In table 7 we present similar regression results to those in table 6 for export potential. 
Export potential for each country is calculated as the sum of all other countries’ 
import weighted by the inverse of the distance between the country in question and 
the other countries. The sum is then divided by GDP and normalised to the average. 
The export potential for each country should be interpreted as a potential only. It is 
based on each trading partners total imports and we assume that these imports could 
reflect exports of other countries adjusted by the distance between the trading 
partners.  
 
Export data would reflect a wide range of variables, like productivity, costs and 
quality of products, which correlates with growth. As such export data cannot be used 
to draw inferences on the relationship between trade and growth. Productivity is 
important both for growth and trade. Therefore the results we reported on in table 5 
(on exports’ impact on growth) can be easily criticised. Our export potential 
expression does not correlate with national determinants of exports. The reason is that 
each countries’ export potential is constructed not on the basis of data that reflect 
conditions within the countries’ economies, but rather on data that reflect other 
countries’ imports.  
 
Also, we believe that export potential reflect trade policy of other countries. If a 
country has high trade barriers its imports in general will be reduced. Therefore, this 
country will reduce the export potential of other countries. Our export potential 
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measure might therefore also reflect the impact of openness. Clemens and Williamson 
(2004) include average tariff barriers in countries’ trading partners in some 
regressions in their historical study of a sample of few countries. They find that tariffs 
reduce growth in exporting countries, but the coefficients are not significant. More 
elaborate studies on this is called for in order to shed light on this important topic.  
 
The results reported in table 7 give indications that export potential has a positive and 
significant effect on growth. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level. Note however, that the coefficient is smaller in magnitude and 
less significant than the one for import potential 
 
 
Table 7 Growth and exports potential 
 
N=110 R2=0.33  
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
lgdp90 -0.0033 0.239 
lpop90 0.0007 0.573 
exportpotential 0.0056 0.081 
Lgfc 0.0315 0.001 
Trans -0.0228 0.064 
Europe -0.0092 0.157 
Asia -0.0110 0.048 
Africa -0.0233 0.000 
namerica -0.0059 0.329 
lamerica -0.0133 0.007 
 
From table 7 we cannot conclude whether it is openness or geographical distance that 
is the most important for countries’ export performance. In order to check for this it 
would have been necessary to include countries’ tariffs and other trade policy 
measures. It is beyond the scope of this paper to do this. The impact of market access 
on growth is an important question and we regret that only few studies have 
concentrated on this issue.  
 
Trade policy  and growth.  
 
Such neglect is not the case for the relationships between trade policy and domestic 
growth effects. There are many studies on the impact of openness on growth. From 
our discussion about trade policy, protection and growth above, there is no reason to 
expect a clear and unambiguous relationship. We presented arguments that tariffs and 
protection in many cases have potential growth stimulating effects. If a country 
succeeds in designing its trade policy so as to protect its ‘promising’ industries, 
protection might stimulate growth. We also argued that trade policy is risky. 
Governments have imperfect information about growth potentials in different 
industries. Therefore the chances of imposing tariffs in the ‘wrong’ industries exist. In 
that case, tariffs may be harmful for growth. We argued that many developing 
countries use trade policy not only to protect its industry but also to collect taxes. 
Probably such practice is harmful for growth.  
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There is a large and growing literature on the impacts of tariffs and growth in the 
countries that impose the tariffs. Here we will review just a few of these studies. We 
limit ourselves to the studies by Dollars (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards 
(1998) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003). These studies are the most cited ones and 
they have also been intensively reviewed by others, like Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(1999). 
 
Dollar (1992) has been one of the most cited studies of the relationships between 
openness and growth. Dollar does not use indices of trade policy directly. Instead he 
used deviations in domestic prices as compared to the price level in the USA. As 
discussed above, international trade tends to equalize prices between countries. The 
law of one price says that tradable goods should cost the same everywhere if there are 
no trade restrictions. If the law of one price holds only trade restrictions could explain 
deviations between domestic prices on tradable goods and international prices. Dollar 
also uses variability of prices as a measure of trade restrictions. Thereafter Dollar 
regresses growth on the index for price distortions, its variability and investments. He 
finds that both price distortions and their variability are significantly and negatively 
related to growth. Dollar concludes that open economies tend to have higher growth 
rates than other economies. Rodriguez and Rodrik examine Dollar’s result. They 
argue that his results may not reflect real relationships between openness and growth. 
They use two sets of arguments for this. The first is that even open economies may 
experience deviations from the law of one price. One reason for this is that exchange 
rates often vary considerably over time. Often price changes that could restore the law 
of one price after exchange rate chocks occur slowly. Therefore deviations from the 
law of one price are the rule rather than the exception even for open economies. The 
second line of arguments is that Dollar’s specification is non-standard. As mentioned, 
Dollar includes in his regression investments and his indices for price distortions and 
variability. As we have discussed at length, also other variables influence on growth. 
At the very least, growth regressions should include initial income per capita (to 
control for convergence) and regional dummy variables. Rodriguez and Rodrik show 
that when such variables are included, Dollar’s results are no longer valid.  
 
Another influential study is the one by Sachs and Warner (1995). Sachs and Warner 
construct a zero-one openness variable, which is equal to zero for ‘closed’ economies 
and one for ‘open’ economies. An economy is classified as ‘closed’ if any of five 
criteria is fulfilled. These criteria are that  
 
a) average tariff rates higher than 40 %  
b) non-tariff barriers covering more than 40 % of imports  
c) a socialist economic system  
d) state monopolies on important export goods 
e) the black market premium on foreign currency exceeds 20 %.  
 
Sachs and Warner argue that each of these criteria distorts trade to a significant degree 
and that only countries that fail to fulfil all of them can be characterised as open. Each 
of the five criteria are sufficient for being classified as ‘closed’. Sachs and Warner 
demonstrates that their openness variable is robust and significant when inserted into 
growth regressions. They also show that among the countries that qualified as open, 
not a single country grew at rates less than 1,2 per cent per year. Among the 
developing country, not a single open country grew at less than 2 per cent. Among the 
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non-qualifiers, only seven developing countries experienced growth rates at 3 per cent 
per year or more. Sachs and Warner discuss these seven cases and argue that only one 
(China) represents a case against their argument. For the other six there were good 
reasons why the non-qualifying countries had high growth rate in the period analysed.   
 
The study by Sachs and Warner has been criticised. One criticism is that the openness 
variable reflects a wide set of indicators for bad policies and not only trade policy. As 
such Sachs and Warner do not show that trade barriers reduces growth, but that bad 
policy does. That could hardly be a surprise. The second type of criticism is that the 
indicator for socialist economic systems biases the sample. In the period studied by 
Sachs and Warner, the formerly planned economies did experience low growth rates. 
However, in the previous decades these countries had experienced very high growth 
rates. Therefore, it should be possible to grow fast even without liberal trade policies. 
Also, it is argued that not all the criteria included in Sachs and Warner’s openness 
variable are necessary to include. Rodriguez and Rodrik show that inclusion only of 
state monopoly for exports and black market premium gives approximately the same 
results in growth regressions. Therefore, tariffs and non-tariff barriers may not be 
harmful for growth even if Sachs and Warner’s index contain these variables. We are 
left with the impression that Sachs and Warner do not measure trade policy’s impact 
on growth, but rather the impact of a composite index for bad economic policy.  
 
Edwards (1998) uses nine alternative measures for trade policy in his study of the 
relationships between trade and growth. Edwards does not regress growth in income 
per capita, but growth in productivity on a set of explanatory variables, including his 
openness variables.12 The additional explanatory variables are initial income per 
capita and indices if human capital measured by average years of schooling in the 
initial period in his study (1965). The nine openness variables include Sachs and 
Warner’s openness variable, some of its components (like black market premium), 
average tariff rates, coverage of non-tariff barriers and several indices constructed by 
other authors. Edwards argue that many of the studies on the relationship between 
trade and growth do not contain appropriate checks for robustness of the variables. 
Edwards therefore includes other’s indices for openness in order to test for robustness. 
Edwards finds that all the openness indicators had a positive estimated impact on 
growth and that they were significant in the majority of cases. Edwards conclude that 
his results ‘suggest that more open economies have indeed experienced faster 
productivity growth’.  
 
Edwards estimation procedure is somewhat special. Edwards weights the observations 
in his sample with GDP per capita. This is done in order to take into account so-called 
heteroscedasticity in the data. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) show that this weighting 
is inappropriate. By weighting the observations with the log of GDP per capita only 
five of the nine openness variables are significant and when estimated the standard 
way, only four of the nine variables are significant.13 Edwards’ study does not 
therefore, lends support to a view that there is a robust and clear relationship between 
openness and growth. 
 
                                                 
12 Edwards uses growth in total factor productivity, TFP. TFP is a constructed measure that adjusts 
growth in income for growth in use factors of production, in particular labour and capital. 
13 The standard way to take into account heteroscedasticity is to use White’s (1980) consistent standard 
errors. In this paper, we report only p-values based on this procedure.  
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The last study we review is a new one. This is Wacziarg and Welch (2003). Wacziarg 
and Welch update and extend the openness indicator from Sachs and Warner so that it 
covers a longer period and more countries. They show that this indicator is not 
significantly correlated with growth in the most recent period. A more important 
contribution from the paper by Wacziarg and and Welch is to review the time paths of 
growth for individual countries. They show that after trade liberalisation very often 
growth rates increase to a level higher than before trade liberalisation. This indicates 
that periods of liberalisation increase subsequent growth. Wacziarg and Welch report 
results indicating that countries experienced 1.5 to 2 percentage points higher growth 
rates after trade liberalisation than before. Trade as share of GDP increase by 5 
percentage point in the aftermath of liberalisation. An important hesitation however, 
is that periods of liberalisation very often comes at the same time as other types of 
policy changes. This could be stricter macro-economic policies, borrowing from the 
IMF, structural reforms or other types of policy changes. Also, policy changes often 
come after a period of recessions. In periods when the economy is growing fast, 
policy changes may not be regarded as necessary. Therefore, there are doubts whether 
the results obtained by Wacziard and Welch really reflect long run growth effects of 
trade policy or business cycle effects. Wacziarg and Welch also note that there is 
much variability in the responses to trade liberalisation. Some countries manage to 
increase their growth rates considerably while others do not succeed. They therefore 
conclude that ‘future research should seek to further identify factors accounting for 
heterogeneity in the growth effects of trade reform’.  
 
Rodrik (1999) argue that trade policy may be important for countries’ growth 
performance, but that other variables are also important. Trade liberalisation may 
often stimulate investments, increase competition and improve macro economic 
performance. For long run growth rates to increase however, a wider set of policies 
should be imposed. Such policies should take into account specific conditions in each 
society, take notice of possible conflicts of interest and prevent new conflicts.  
 
In sum, a growing literature of growth effects of trade policy has not yet established 
robust and clear relationships between openness and growth. From the literature 
however, our impressions are: 
 
a) Most studies conclude that there is a positive relationship between openness 
and growth.  
b) Measurement problems, statistical challenges and heterogeneity means that 
clear empirical relationships are hard to detect. 
c) Many variables influence on growth, and probably so to a different degree in 
different societies. Therefore more work is called for in order to establish the  
role of trade policy in growth promoting reforms.  
 
Trade and poverty 
 
Our main focus in this paper is the literature on trade and growth. Growth in 
developing countries is presumed to have positive effects on poverty and for the well 
being of the poor. There is no guarantee however, that economic growth benefits the 
poor. In fact, many argue that globalisation and increased international 
competitiveness increases inequality within countries so that openness may actually 
harm poor people. If inequality is constant and trade stimulates growth however, poor 
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people will generally benefit from international trade. Kuznets (1955) postulates an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and development. Development 
results in higher income. Since development will tend to benefit some parts of the 
population first, inequality may increase in early phases of development. Only later 
on, when larger fractions of the population have experienced the positive effects of 
development, will inequality decrease, simply because the ‘pool’ of poor becomes 
smaller. Kuznets’ approach is relevant in many countries. For instance, the Chinese 
economy is characterised by dualism. In some parts of the country, modern industries 
with high wages grow fast. In other parts of the country, traditional and low-
productive agriculture dominates. Therefore inequality has increased in China. It 
should not however, be concluded that the high growth in China has harmed Chinese 
poor. China has now fewer poor people than before and also the lowest part of the 
income distribution experience growth in their incomes.  
 
There are several studies about trade and poverty. For these issues methodological 
challenges abound. For poverty and inequality data are of worse quality than for 
macroeconomic variables like GDP per capita. Existing data are often based on 
household surveys. In many cases time series are short and observations for many 
countries are missing. In other cases poverty indices used for different countries are 
not easy to compare. Milanovic (2005) reviews the literature.  
 
There are also case studies existing and there are some studies on effects of trade 
policy on the within-country income distribution for some countries. In Ben-David et 
al. (1999) possible links between poverty and international trade are discussed. These 
links go through labour markets, product markets and markets for intermediates. They 
also go through the effects of trade on institutions, competition and corruption. In 
addition comes trade’s potential for creating conflicts. 
 
More systematic studies using larger data sets for more countries are few. In addition 
to Milanovic’s study we review Lundberg and Squire (2003) and Dollar and Kraay 
(2004).  
 
Lundberg and Squire incorporate the Kuznets mechanism with analyses of welfare 
effects for poor of growth. They use the Sachs-Warner index for openness (see above) 
and indicate that increased openness both result in growth and increased inequality. 
They argue that the effect on inequality is minor.  
 
By use of a broader dataset based on household surveys Dollar and Kraay reach a 
different conclusion. They find that openness (defined as export plus imports as share 
of GDP) is positively associated with per capita income growth and that this effect is 
the same for the bottom income quintile as for the average income. Essentially this 
means that incomes of the poor grow at the same rate as incomes for the country in 
general. Milanovic (2005) on the other hand, using a better data set and a more 
detailed analysis, finds the opposite result. In poor countries, it is the rich and not the 
poor who benefits from openness. Only when average income rises, the incomes of 
the poor and the middle class rise proportionately more than incomes of the rich.  
 
Studies of larger samples of countries have reached different conclusions on the effect 
of international trade on poverty and inequality. Existing research does not support 
the view that globalisation generally harms poor people. Rather, there is evidence that 
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economic growth benefits the lower parts of the income distribution. Often however, 
the poor benefit less and later than rich from their countries opening up for 
international trade.  
 
 
Conclusions and summary 
 
In this paper we have discussed the literature on trade and growth. This literature has 
grown fast in recent years. Despite the many article that have emerged, there is still no 
agreement among economists about the relationship between trade and growth. Most 
economists conclude that there is a positive relationship. Our results have given 
support for this view. We have established that trade as share of GDP does indeed 
correlate positively with growth. We have also established that trade promoting 
conditions, like market potential is an important determinant for growth. So are 
import potentials and export potentials. From our review of the literature on trade 
policy and growth, however, we did not find support for any clear conclusions, even if 
most studies conclude that openness do in fact stimulate economics growth.  
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Appendix A 
 
Figure 1A Growth rates and initial income levels, weighted by population 
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Appendix B. Effects of trade policy. 
 
In this hypothetical example there are two countries. The home country (represented 
by the graph to the left in the figure and the foreign country (represented by the graph 
to the right in the figure). Both the home country and the foreign country produce the 
good in question. Let’s denote this good beef. The foreign country has better 
conditions for production of beef than the home country. Therefore production costs 
increase less per unit produced in the foreign country than in the home country. This 
is why the supply curve is drawn steeper for the home country (S) than for the foreign 
country (S*). If the home country decides to produce its beef itself it will need to 
protect its beef producers. In the absence of international trade, the price and quantity 
of beef will be determined by the intersection of the home supply curve (S) and the 
home demand cure (D). This gives the price level P. If the home country instead 
allows free trade in beef, domestic consumers will buy beef from the foreign country 
as long as this beef is cheaper than in the home country. Prices abroad are lower than 
in the home country so there will be trade.  
 
 
 
Home’s import demand will be given by the difference between its own demand 
curve and its domestic producers supply. For prices below P this difference is 
positive. The home country’s import demand curve (ID) is drawn in the figure in the 
middle, between the figures that describe the home country’s market and the foreign 
country’s market.  
 
The foreign producers of beef will export beef as long as the international price is 
higher than in their home market. As can be seen from the right figure, this will be the 
case for all prices that are higher than were the demand and the supply curve in the 
foreign market cross. The export supply from the foreign country is the IS curve in the 
mid figure.  
 
The world market price (in this hypothetical world with two countries) is the price 
where the IS and the ID curve cross each other. The world price in the case of free 
trade is Pw.  
 
Now assume that domestic beef producers persuade its government to impose a tariff 
on imports of beef. In the figure, the tariff equals the double arrow in the figure. The 
tariff in this example is a fixed tariff and not an ad valorem tariff. This tariff has the 
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following effects. The tariff creates a wedge between the prices received by foreign 
beef producers and domestic consumers. This wedge equals the amount of the tariff. 
Prices in the home country increase to Pt. This is not equal to the amount of the tariff 
because prices on the world market decreases along the foreign country’s export 
supply curve, IS. The increased price in the home country stimulates domestic 
production. It also reduces domestic consumption of beef. The result is that imports of 
beef decline.  
 
In the foreign country the reduced world market price for beef reduces production 
along the foreign country’s supply curve, S*. The reduced price for beef increases 
demand in the foreign country and therefore consumption of beef in the foreign 
country.  
 
Welfare effects of trade policy are controversial and hard to calculate. A standard, but 
controversial measure for welfare is the areas below the demand curves and above the 
supply curves. In our example, the demand curve illustrates what consumers are 
willing to pay for beef. The price is what they actually pay. Consumers’ welfare is the 
difference, i.e. the area between the demand curve and the price. Suppliers’ profit is 
the difference between their unit costs and the price they receive. Therefore profit is 
often calculated as the difference between the price and the supply curve. If consumer 
and producer surpluses are valued equally, welfare effects of tariffs may be 
calculated.  
 
In the home country producers gain and consumers loose from the tariff. The increase 
in producer surplus is the increase in the area between the price and the supply curve. 
This is equal to the area a. Consumers loose an amount equal to the area a+b. In 
addition come government incomes from the tariff which is not drawn in the figure. In 
the foreign country suppliers loose and consumers gain from the tariff. The loss in 
producers surplus equals the area c+d. The gain for consumers equals the area c.  
 
Straightforward conclusions form this simple exercise are therefore: 
 
· Consumers in the importing country loose from tariffs. 
· Producers in the importing country gain from tariffs, but their gain is less than 
what the consumers loose.  
· The overall impact in the importing country is not clear since the government 
collects the tariff. To the extent that the world market of the imported good 
decrease, an optimal tariff is positive. 
· Consumers in the exporting country gain from tariffs.  
· Producers in the exporting country loose from tariffs and producers’ loss is 
larger than what consumers gain.  
 
 
The example presented here is too simple to be realistic. It demonstrates though, that 
exporting countries will tend to loose from tariffs in their foreign markets.  
 
 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 33
Appendix C: List of countries used in growth regressions. 
 
Country growth lgdp90 lGFC TRAD impot expot MP90 
Albania 0.032528 7.970948 3.121443 47.12818 2.40E+09 2.49E+09 9.90E+09 
Algeria 0.001389 8.520607 3.352803 46.26455 2.10E+09 2.18E+09 8.51E+09 
Argentina 0.012548 9.022359  16.44182 5.61E+08 5.86E+08 3.00E+09 
Australia 0.021382 9.871325 3.17574 35.57455 4.61E+08 4.41E+08 2.21E+09 
Austria 0.018378 9.940687 3.144387 74.80637 3.42E+09 3.48E+09 1.32E+10 
Bahrain 0.012026 9.485393 3.117628 178.9236 1.49E+09 1.19E+09 5.01E+09 
Bangladesh 0.027455 6.984624 2.842793 20.33 9.59E+08 8.77E+08 4.84E+09 
Barbados 0.008722 9.409109 2.732063 105.6864 9.29E+08 1.00E+09 4.70E+09 
Belgium 0.014469 9.929448 2.984763 133.9682 6.87E+09 6.80E+09 2.36E+10 
Belize 0.026876 8.269116 3.194434 119.4009 1.03E+09 1.15E+09 5.27E+09 
Benin 0.019427 6.623627 2.615602 46.62455 1.20E+09 9.87E+08 4.82E+09 
Bolivia 0.007699 7.593223 2.645723 46.40454 6.46E+08 6.80E+08 3.46E+09 
Botswana 0.026331 8.570488 3.323563 103.2518 7.47E+08 7.04E+08 3.69E+09 
Brazil 0.011953 8.692658 3.011919 16.95182 6.29E+08 6.59E+08 3.10E+09 
Bulgaria -0.00545 8.816646 3.043353 87.01727 2.21E+09 2.28E+09 9.76E+09 
Burkina Faso 0.016599 6.67921 2.93844 36.12182 1.01E+09 1.01E+09 4.12E+09 
Burundi -0.03073 6.699119 2.691305 36.62909 7.88E+08 7.68E+08 3.36E+09 
Cameroon -0.00583 7.548134 2.901222 40.18364 8.92E+08 8.65E+08 3.90E+09 
Canada 0.015688 9.981976 3.017716 57.04091 1.73E+09 2.28E+09 1.18E+10 
Central African Republic -0.00825 7.045254 2.451632 43.66636 8.82E+08 8.64E+08 3.74E+09 
Chad 0.003331 6.76732 1.976225 45.20818 1.01E+09 9.96E+08 3.90E+09 
Chile 0.040428 8.585692 3.061009 59.79364 5.47E+08 5.70E+08 3.00E+09 
China 0.083841 7.301418 3.431668 33.30545 1.00E+09 9.53E+08 4.52E+09 
Colombia 0.00308 8.600965 2.88475 32.70273 8.19E+08 8.81E+08 4.28E+09 
Comoros -0.01439 7.485435 2.845332 58.55273 7.01E+08 6.76E+08 2.71E+09 
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.07841 7.301148 2.314604 46.63364 8.02E+08 7.78E+08 3.14E+09 
Congo, Rep. -0.0025 6.794744 3.174221 98.26637 8.02E+08 7.78E+08 3.50E+09 
Costa Rica 0.023134 8.688285 2.978262 72.11455 8.83E+08 9.71E+08 4.71E+09 
Cote d'Ivoire -0.0185 7.427382 2.367095 64.41727 8.99E+08 9.08E+08 4.03E+09 
Denmark 0.016776 10.01713 2.977985 66.00727 3.32E+09 3.26E+09 1.21E+10 
Dominican Republic 0.037617 8.228097 3.117467 67.77728 1.03E+09 1.16E+09 5.59E+09 
Ecuador -0.00126 8.077602 2.959492 58.04727 7.64E+08 8.20E+08 4.15E+09 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.018819 7.89711 3.151959 51.63636 1.43E+09 1.42E+09 6.27E+09 
El Salvador 0.021953 8.110097 2.712646 49.10182 9.85E+08 1.08E+09 5.01E+09 
Ethiopia 0.012774 6.387939 2.618788 24.76727 9.12E+08 8.75E+08 3.94E+09 
Fiji 0.01585 8.28969 2.613073 107.3536 4.88E+08 4.78E+08 2.06E+09 
Finland 0.012975 9.895909 3.17987 53.39455 2.20E+09 2.11E+09 9.26E+09 
France 0.013483 9.917489 3.035172 42.61636 4.39E+09 4.50E+09 1.47E+10 
Gabon 0.00275 8.639694 3.354137 88.64182 8.53E+08 8.31E+08 3.67E+09 
Gambia, The -0.00868 7.418001 2.955194 118.6209 9.55E+08 9.91E+08 3.82E+09 
Germany 0.01463 9.910414 3.121484 48.42636 4.29E+09 4.44E+09 1.40E+10 
Ghana 0.018786 7.314819 2.702154 45.22364 9.40E+08 9.07E+08 4.22E+09 
Greece 0.024002 9.427868 3.061392 45.24273 1.90E+09 1.92E+09 8.29E+09 
Guatemala 0.010389 8.0674 2.586601 39.37455 9.85E+08 1.09E+09 5.03E+09 
Guinea-Bissau -0.02348 6.727911 3.493804 51.13 9.30E+08 9.60E+08 3.28E+09 
Guyana 0.013703 8.070469 3.434046 184.0382 8.48E+08 9.04E+08 4.27E+09 
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Haiti -0.03381 7.668748 2.499721 37.66091 1.06E+09 1.21E+09 5.51E+09 
Honduras -0.00012 7.745003 2.992682 66.85091 9.73E+08 1.08E+09 5.11E+09 
Hungary 0.012234 9.234545 3.055372 71.11727 2.96E+09 3.04E+09 1.18E+10 
Iceland 0.013149 10.0214 2.949498 68.42 1.58E+09 1.60E+09 6.60E+09 
India 0.034452 7.354938 3.092446 16.63545 9.50E+08 8.82E+08 4.03E+09 
Indonesia 0.026145 7.643723 3.268532 47.97091 8.07E+08 7.78E+08 3.10E+09 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.027998 8.350642 2.902819 30.5 1.25E+09 1.16E+09 5.47E+09 
Ireland 0.069128 9.550306 2.83961 115.7573 2.91E+09 3.00E+09 1.12E+10 
Israel 0.014449 9.585072 3.04001 84.01546 1.43E+09 1.47E+09 5.90E+09 
Italy 0.013166 9.902838 3.013617 40.80636 2.33E+09 2.38E+09 9.02E+09 
Jamaica -0.00087 8.178611 3.218512 106.6409 1.03E+09 1.17E+09 5.60E+09 
Japan 0.009314 9.968104 3.385899 18.29636 8.14E+08 7.63E+08 3.59E+09 
Jordan 0.004237 8.174929 3.230301 122.0382 1.57E+09 1.57E+09 6.42E+09 
Kenya -0.01241 6.953684 2.762022 58.67636 7.92E+08 7.67E+08 3.63E+09 
Korea, Rep. 0.048474 9.034713 3.517633 62.02727 1.28E+09 1.09E+09 6.69E+09 
Lao PDR 0.038613 6.868224  39.18636 1.07E+09 9.67E+08 3.89E+09 
Lesotho 0.048639 7.088158 3.924365 135.31 6.63E+08 6.38E+08 2.77E+09 
Luxembourg 0.053286 10.26102 3.102832 205.5273 1.11E+10 1.11E+10 3.50E+10 
Madagascar -0.02308 6.768137 2.425285 41.59364 6.49E+08 6.25E+08 2.94E+09 
Malawi 0.006328 6.168019 2.851074 59.67273 7.07E+08 6.86E+08 3.08E+09 
Malaysia 0.038693 8.53283 3.484173 142.3809 1.03E+09 1.06E+09 3.92E+09 
Mali 0.022645 6.437175 3.082285 53.23363 9.77E+08 9.96E+08 4.02E+09 
Malta 0.038485 9.194811 3.35051 180.7382 2.12E+09 2.16E+09 9.04E+09 
Mauritania 0.036976 7.138311 3.126322 109.4482 1.03E+09 1.07E+09 4.54E+09 
Mauritius 0.039005 8.699081 3.233854 123.3964 6.25E+08 5.98E+08 2.81E+09 
Mexico 0.011655 8.840667 2.915163 36.95182 7.94E+08 8.89E+08 4.38E+09 
Mongolia -0.01401 7.49053 3.693935 116.5873 1.17E+09 1.03E+09 5.30E+09 
Morocco 0.007181 8.037737 3.088353 55.60637 1.67E+09 1.75E+09 7.17E+09 
Mozambique 0.039012 6.365783 2.639252 44.71545 6.82E+08 6.55E+08 3.40E+09 
Namibia 0.002532 8.582194 2.875873 115.98 6.59E+08 6.44E+08 2.94E+09 
Nepal 0.021055 6.851407 2.97102 39.00727 9.95E+08 9.09E+08 5.45E+09 
Netherlands 0.020411 9.912348 3.070966 104.1736 5.38E+09 5.56E+09 1.88E+10 
New Zealand 0.020177 9.623509 3.02171 56.00909 4.39E+08 4.32E+08 2.17E+09 
Nicaragua 0.011151 7.556428 3.043223 65.86636 9.48E+08 1.04E+09 4.91E+09 
Niger -0.01196 6.707632 2.244763 40.44909 1.03E+09 1.03E+09 4.08E+09 
Nigeria -0.00641 6.707486 2.884699 64.75 9.02E+08 9.17E+08 4.03E+09 
Norway 0.024512 10.09221 3.139124 71.17727 2.66E+09 2.63E+09 1.01E+10 
Pakistan 0.009362 7.337327 2.862097 35.95546 1.06E+09 9.73E+08 6.17E+09 
Panama 0.022574 8.334519 2.805397 70.80363 8.87E+08 9.65E+08 4.76E+09 
Papua New Guinea 0.010497 7.478283 3.080992 94.35909 5.88E+08 5.56E+08 2.64E+09 
Paraguay -0.00502 8.374269 3.119397 70.26363 6.28E+08 6.50E+08 3.53E+09 
Peru 0.018267 8.179115 2.995778 30.10455 6.49E+08 6.87E+08 3.46E+09 
Philippines 0.00275 8.181553 3.009546 61.21 8.80E+08 8.00E+08 4.02E+09 
Portugal 0.023527 9.41001 3.193092 66.38545 1.92E+09 2.01E+09 8.05E+09 
Rwanda 0.00129 7.010943 2.669435 30.38909 8.06E+08 7.86E+08 3.03E+09 
Saudi Arabia 0.002598 9.293118 3.015579 68.42 1.13E+09 1.06E+09 4.82E+09 
Senegal 0.006563 7.164334 2.589744 59.78545 9.62E+08 9.94E+08 4.35E+09 
Sierra Leone -0.05801 6.835152 2.102137 42.97091 9.03E+08 9.31E+08 3.63E+09 
South Africa -0.00291 9.131265 2.888451 45.36636 6.11E+08 6.08E+08 2.86E+09 
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Spain 0.021933 9.589256 3.133239 38.42 2.16E+09 2.20E+09 8.59E+09 
Sri Lanka 0.031031 7.685887 3.164285 68.79091 8.09E+08 7.52E+08 3.80E+09 
Swaziland 0.002677 8.268553 3.020691 159.0755 7.17E+08 6.81E+08 3.68E+09 
Sweden 0.014502 9.872307 2.99104 60.86636 2.42E+09 2.35E+09 9.69E+09 
Switzerland -0.00035 10.19208 3.198079 69.97818 4.16E+09 4.25E+09 1.54E+10 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.022714 7.799999 3.090381 55.32636 1.57E+09 1.64E+09 6.42E+09 
Thailand 0.034244 8.32271 3.562517 70.97909 9.28E+08 8.52E+08 4.02E+09 
Togo -0.0135 7.339148 2.821649 80.91637 9.94E+08 9.44E+08 4.00E+09 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.022157 8.764568 2.838547 75.57636 9.05E+08 9.68E+08 4.54E+09 
Tunisia 0.029977 8.338186 3.27271 84.04 2.21E+09 2.25E+09 9.23E+09 
Turkey 0.013194 8.482519 3.129031 34.53182 1.62E+09 1.60E+09 7.06E+09 
Uganda 0.035088 6.692815 2.5303 28.38636 8.13E+08 7.91E+08 3.66E+09 
United Kingdom 0.017429 9.841293 2.900872 51.88818 4.20E+09 4.17E+09 1.39E+10 
United States 0.015692 10.17451 2.876693 20.15909 1.03E+09 9.28E+08 3.53E+09 
Uruguay 0.004066 8.796051 2.544104 41.21636 6.72E+08 6.76E+08 4.14E+09 
Venezuela, RB -0.00968 8.586084 2.930903 50.60455 8.65E+08 9.59E+08 4.67E+09 
Zambia -0.01446 6.783733 2.345819 73.28909 7.06E+08 6.85E+08 3.23E+09 
 
 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 36
References 
 
Arora, V. and A. Vamvakidis (2005) “How Much Do Trading Partners Matter for 
Economic Growth?” IMF Staff Papers, 52 (1), 24-40.  
 
Barro, R. J. (1991) “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 404-443. 
 
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995) Economic Growth, McGrawhill, New York. 
 
Baumol, W. J. (1986) “Productivity Growth, Convergence, and Welfare: What the 
Long-Run Data Show”, American Economic Review, 76, 5, 1072-85. 
 
Ben-David. D. (1996) “Trade and Convergence Among Countries” Journal of 
International Economics 40 (3-4) 279-298. 
 
Ben-David, D., H. Nordström and L. A. Winters (1999) Trade, income disparity and 
poverty Special Studies, World Trade Organization, Geneve. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/special_study_5_e.pdf 
 
Brenton, P. and F. Di Mauro (1999) “The Potential Magnitude and Impact of FDI 
flows to CEECs” Journal of Economic Integration 14 (1), 59-74.  
 
Chang, H.-J.(2002), Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective. Anthem Press London. 
 
Clemens, M. A. And J. G. Williamson (2004) “Why did the Tariff-Growth 
Correlation Change after 1950?” Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 5-46. 
 
Coe, D. and E. Helpman (1995) “International R&D Spillovers” European Economic 
Review, 39, 859-87. 
 
Coe, D., E. Helpman and A. W. Hoffmaister (1997) “North-South Spillovers” 
Economic Journal,  107, 139-149.  
 
Dollar, D. (1992) “Outward Oriented Development Economies Really Do Grow More 
Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDC, 1976-1985” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 40 (3) 523-544. 
 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2004) “Trade Growth and Poverty” Economic Journal 114, 
F22-F49.  
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (2001) “Trade in Capital Goods” European Economic 
Review¸45 (7) 1195-1235.  
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (2002) “Technology, Geography and Trade” Econometrica 
70 (5) 1741-1779. 
Edwards, S. (1998) “Openness, Productivity and Growth: What Do We Really 
Know?” The Economic Journal, 108 (447) 383-398. 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 37
Gaulier. G. (2003) Trade and Convergence: Revisiting Ben-David CEPII Working 
Paper No 6., Paris.  
 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991) Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Helpman, E. (1993) “Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights” 
Econometrica, 61 (6), 1247-1280. 
 
Helpman, E. and P. R. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade – 
Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the International Economy MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
Jaffe, A. B., M. Trajtenberg and R. Hendersen (1993) ”Geographic Localization of 
Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 108, 577-98. 
 
Krugman, P. (1979) ‘A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer and the World 
Distribution of Income’, Journal of Political Economy, 87, 253-66. 
 
Krugman, P. R. and M. Obstfeld (2003) International Economics – Theory and Policy 
6th edition, Addison Wesley, Boston.  
 
Kuznets, S. (1955) “Economic Growth and Income Inequality” American Economic 
Review 45, 35-49. 
 
Leamer, E. E. and J. Levinsohn (1995) “International Trade Theory: The Evidence” in 
Grossman, G. M. and K. Rogoff (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam.  
 
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Development Planning” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, 1, 3-42. 
 
Lundberg, M. and L. Squire (2003) “The Simultaneous Evolution of Growth and 
Inequality” Economic Journal 113, 326-344. 
 
Maurseth, P. B. (2005) Norway’s trade with developing countries NUPI Working 
Paper No 682, Oslo.  
 
Maurseth, P. B. (2003a) “Economic Convergence through Savings, Trade and 
Technology Flows: Lessons from Recent Research” Forum for Development Studies, 
30 (1) 29-58. 
 
Maurseth, P. B. (2003b) “Geography and Growth – Some Empirical Evidence” 
Nordic Journal of Political Economy 29 (1) 25-46. 
 
Melchior, A. and K. Telle (2001) “Global Income Distribution 1965-98: Convergence 
and Marginalisation” Forum for Development Studies 1, 75-98. 
 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 38
Milanovic, B. (2005) “Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on Income 
Distribution? Evidence from Household Surveys” World Bank Economic Review 19 
(1), 21-44.  
 
Narvestad, S. O. (2000) De tidligere planøkonomienes plass i Europa – en 
undersøkelse av investeringsstrømmer i lys av integrasjonsprosessen. 
 
Prebish, R. (1959) “Commercial Policies in the Underdeveloped Countries” American 
Economic Review, May, 251-273. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, L.A. and P. Romer (1991) “Economic Integration and Economic 
Growth” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 531-556. 
 
Rodrik, D. (1999) The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making 
Openness Work” Policy Essay No 24, John Hopkins University Press, Washington. 
D.C.  
 
Rodrik, D. and F. Rodriguez (1999) Trade Policy and Economic Growth – A Sceptic’s 
Guide to the Cross National Evidence NBER Working Paper No 7081. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1986) ‘Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94, 1002-37. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1990) ‘Endogenous Technological Change’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98, 71-102. 
 
Santos-Paulino, A. and A. P. Thirlwall (2004) “The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on 
Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments of Developing Countries” Economic 
Journal, 114, F50-F72.  
 
Sachs. J. D. and A. Warner (1995) “Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-118. 
 
Quah, D. (1996) “Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence” European 
Economic Review, 40 (6), 1353-1375. 
 
Quah, D. (1992) “Galton’s Fallacy and Test of the Convergence Hypothesis” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 95 (4), 427-443.  
 
Wacziarg, R. and K. H. Welch (2003) “Trade Liberalization and Economic Growth: 
The Evidence” NBER Working Paper no 10152.  
 
White, H. L. (1980) “A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator 
and a direct Test for Heteroscedasticity” Econometrica 48, 817-838. 
 
Winters, L. A. (2004) “Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: An 
Overview” Economic Journal 114, F4-F21.  
 
World Bank (2004) World Development Indicators. CD-rom. Washington. 
Maurseth: Trade and Development 
 39
 
Young, A. (1991) ‘Learning by Doing And the Dynamic Effects of International 
Trade’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 369-406. 
 
